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According to a recent decision of the Supreme Court of
Iowa, under Article 6 of the Constitution of the United States,
Aliens,
Right of
Inheritance,

conflict of
Laws,
Federal

Treaties and
State Laws

which provides that the constitution, laws made in
pursuance thereof, and federal treaties with foreign
countries, shall be the supreme law of the land,
notwithstanding anything in the constitution or

laws of a state to the contrary, a federal treaty
with a foreign country, conferring on its subjects,

in spite of their being aliens, a qualified right to take lands in
the United States by inheritance, under the laws here controlling its descent, must prevail over a state law prohibiting aliens
from taking land by descent; and the fact that such a treaty
removes from such aliens the disability to inherit imposed by
a state statute, does not alter the laws of descent of a state so
as to render it unconstitutional, as an infringement of the right
of the state to control its internal policy: Opel v. Shoup, 69
N. W. Rep. 560.
If a citizen or subject of a foreign government is disqualified
under the laws of a state from taking, holding, or transferring
real property, such disqualification will be removed, if a treaty
between the United States and such foreign government
confers the right to take, hold or transfer real property,
whether the disqualification be by common law or express
statute : Warev. Hylton, 3 Dali. 199, 1796; Fairfaxv. Bunter,
7 Cranch, 603, I813; Chirac v. Chirac, 2 Wheat. 259, 1817;
Orr v. Hodgson, 4 Wheat. 453, 1819 ; Society v. New Haven,
8 Wheat. 464, 1823; Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U. S. 483,
1879; Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U. S. 458, 1889, reversing
7 Mackey, (D. C.) 331, 1889; People v. Gerke, 5 Cal. 381,
187
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1855; Schultze v. Schultze, 144 Ill. 290, 1893; and if the
treaty is susceptible of two interpretations the more liberal
is to be preferred: Hauenstein v. Lynham, IOO U. S.
483, 1879 ; Schultze v. Schultze, 144 Ill. 290, 1893. A statute
imposing a succession tax, however, does not violate a treaty
giving aliens the same rights of inheritance as citizens: In re
Stroble's Estate, 39 N. Y. Suppl. 169, 1896; and a treaty
providing that the citizens or subjects of a foreign country
"'shall have free access to the tribunals of justice in their
litigious affairs on the same terms which are granted by the
law and usages of the country to native citizens or subjects,"
does not preclude the United States from giving special
rights of action to its own citizens in particular cases to the
exclusion of some or all aliens: Valk v. United States, 29 Ct.
of Cl. 62, 1894. " Moreover, the treaty, which will suspend or
over-ride the statute of a state, must be a treaty between the
United States and the government of the particular country of
which the alien, claiming to be relieved of the disability imposed
by the state law, is a citizen or subject. A treaty with some
other country, of which such alien is not a citizen or subject,
cannot have the effect of removing the disability complained
of:" Wunderle v. Wunderle, 144 Ill. 40, 1893.
The fact that a law regulating inheritance by aliens may
thus be rendered inoperative as to certain of those embraced
within its terms does not make it a special statute, or a discrimination against those who are still affected by it, within
the constitutional prohibition of such legislation: Wunderle v.
Wunderle, 144 Ill. 40, 1893.
As long as the ancestor is still living, the alien heir has no
rights: Wunderle v. Wunderle, 144 Ill. 40, 1893; but when
once the title to land has vested, it cannot be divested by a
repeal of the treaty: Carnealv. Banks, io Wheat. 181, 1825.
A statute making it a crime for a contractor with a municipal corporation to employ an alien as a laborer on public
works, violates the treaty between the United States and Italy,
which provides that resident Italians in the United States shall
enjoy the same rights and privileges as are secured to our
own citizens: People v. Warren, 34 N. Y. Suppl. 942, 1895.
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The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine has lately rendered
a most valuable decision with regard to the rights of an
architect, specially employed, whose plans prove
Architect,
Comlnsunavailable through an honest mistake ofjudgment
tlon,
miscalcun.,
tion

on his part: Coombs v. Beede, 36 Atl. Rep. 1o4.
The court below charged that if the architect was

expressly told that the cost of the house designed must not
exceed a certain sum, he should either have made plans
accordingly, or frankly told his employer that he could not
do it, and have declined to do it, and that if he undertook the
commission with that specific restriction, he could not recover
any compensation, in case the plans called for a house of
greater cost. But the Supreme Judicial Court granted a new
trial on the ground that this instruction was erroneous, Peters,
C. J., defining the rights and duties of the architect as
follows:
"We must bear in mind that the plaintiff was not a contractor who had entered into an agreement to construct a
house for the defendant, but was merely an agent of the
defendant to assist him in building one. The responsibility
resting on an architect is essentially the same as that which
rests upon the lawyer to his client, or upon the physician to
his patient, or which rests upon any one to another where
such person pretends to possess some skill and ability in some
special employment, and offers his services to the public on
account of his fitness to act in the line of business for which
he may be employed. The undertaking of an architect
implies that. he possesses skill and ability, including taste,
sufficient to enable him to perform the required services at
least ordinarily and reasonably well; and that he will exercise
and apply, in the given case, his skill and ability, his judgment and taste, reasonably and without neglect.
But the
undertaking does not imply or warrant a satisfactory result.
It will be enough that any failure shall not be by the fault of
the architect. There is no implied promise that miscalculations may not occur. An error of judgment is not necesarily
evidence of a want of skill or care, for mistakes and miscalculations are incident
to all the business of life."
i
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The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has recently declared
the just and equitable rule, that a decree for perpetual disbarment of an attorney for attacking the judicial
Attorneys.,
Disbarment integrity of the court in a manner tending to.
influence the court in a decision should not be made when the
attorney has previously been of good character, and assiduous
in his practice, and is past middle life, and therefore is not
likely to succeed in any other vocation; and imposed, in the
case in hand, a disbarment for two years only, on condition of
good behavior, as being sufficient punishment: In re Smitlz,
36 Atl. Rep. 134.
When a transaction made by an officer of a national bank
with intent to defraud, is entered on a deposit slip, the entry
of the contents of that slip upon the books of the
Banks and
Banking,
bank, either by the officer personally, or by
False Entry another under his direction, is the making of a
"false entry," within Rev. Stat. U. S. § 5209: Agnlew v.
United States, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 235.
In a prosecution of a public officer for accepting a bribe to
refrain from the execution of duties enjoined by statute, the
defendant cannot raise the question of the constitutionality of the statute: Newman v. People,.
(Supreme Court of Colorado,) 47 Pac. Rep. 278.
According to a recent decision of the Court of Civil
Appeals of Texas, which seems to be consonant with the
Carriers,
Negligence,

other authorities on the subject, the mere fact
that a train fails to stop the usual and reasonable

Assisting
Passenger

time to enable passengers

on Train

exercising ordinary

diligence to get on and off does not constitute

negligence as to a person who gets on to assist a passenger,
and is injured in getting off after the train has started. He
must give notice of his intention to alight before getting on:
International & G. N. R. R. Co. v. Satterwhite, 38 S. W_
Rep. 401.
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The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, in Coffing-v.
Dodge, 45 N. E. Rep. 928, has lately held, that the liability
of a stockholder of a foreign corporation under
Conflict of
the statutes of the foreign state to a creditor of
Laws,
Penal
the corporation cannot be enforced in MassaStatutes,
Liability of

oaCorpora-

tion to

chusetts, when it is not alleged to be contractual,
or to be so held by the courts of that state. This

appears to be a weak evasion of responsibility. It
was the business of the court to
examine the
statute itself, and, with or without evidence as to the construction put upon it by the courts of the foreign state, to construe
it according to its own views. Further, one would naturally
presume, from the relations of the stockholder and creditor to
each other through the medium of the corporation, that such
a statutory liability is contractual, rather than penal ; and the
defendant should establish the latter fadt. The court should
read the decision of the Privy Council of England in Huntington
v. Attll, [I893] A. C. 150, 1892, especially these sentences
of Lord Watson's opinion: "Judicial decisions in the state
where the cause of action arose are not precedents which
must be followed, although the reasoning upon which they
are founded must always receive careful consideration, and
may be conclusive. The court appealed to must determine
for itself in the first place, the substance of the right sought
to be enforced; and, in the second place, whether its enforcement would, either directly or indirectly, involve the execution
of the penal law of another state. Were any other principle
to guide its decision, a court might find itself in the position
of giving effect in one case and denying effect in another, to
suits of the same character, in consequence of the causes of
action having arisen in different countries ; or in the predicament of being constrained to give effect to laws which were, in
its own judgment, strictly penal." The learned judge, having
in mind the fact that courts were established to give relief to
suitors, never seems to have dreamed of the way out of the
dilemma adopted by the Massachusetts court,-that of refusing
relief altogether, unless the plaintiff forces its hand.
The decision of the Privy Council was approved and adopted
Creditors
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in Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U. S. 657, 1892; so that the
weight of authority is overwhelmingly against the Massachusetts rule.
A statute of the territory of New Mexico provides that
"whenever any person shall die from any injury resulting
Recovery for from or occasioned by the negligence, unskillfulDeath
Caused by
Negligence

ness or criminal intent of any officer, agent,
servant or employe, whilst running, conducting or
managing any locomotive, car, or train of cars,

the corporation, individual, or individuals in whose
.....
employ any such officer, agent, servant, employe, engineer or
driver shall be at the time such injury was committed . ....
shall forfeit and pay for every person or passenger so dying
the sum of $5,ooo, which may be sued and recovered, first by
the husband or wife of the deceased, second, if there be
then by the minor child or
....
no husband or wife.
children of the deceased." The Supreme Court of Kansas,
applying the principle that a penal statute will not be enforced
by the courts of a foreign jurisdiction, has refused to enforce
the liability created by this statute, since it is in part penal, and
gives a right of action to persons other than the one who
would be entitled to recover under the laws of that state in a
similar case arising there: Dale v. Atchinson, Topeka & Santa
Fi R. R. Co., 47 Pac. Rep. 521.

The Supreme Court of the United States has recently
declared, in consonance with its prior rulings, that a suit to
enjoin state officers from seizing private property
Constitutional
under authority of an unconstitutional statute is
Law,
not a suit against the State: Scott v. Donald, 17
Actions
Against
State,

Sup. Ct. Rep. 262; and that a suit for damages

against state officers, who have seized and carried
away private property under color of an unconstiState
Officers
tutional statute, is not a suit against the state;
within the prohibition of the Eleventh Amendment: Scott v.
Donald, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 265. From this latter decision
Mr. Justice Brown dissented.
Proceeaings
Againstste

PROGRESS OF THE LAW.

The same court, following the current of authority, has
decided that the act of Missouri ofMarch 3 1, 1887, which makes
railroad companies liable for property destroyed by
Railroad
fire communicated from their locomotives, and gives
Companies,
Liability for them an insurable interest in the property along
Destruction
of Propertyl
by Fire

their roads, is not in excess of the powers of the
legislature; and that it is not unconstitutional,

either as depriving the companies of property without due
process of law, or as impairing the obligation of a contract
between the companies and the state, by which they are
impliedly permitted to use fire in the operation of their roads,
or as denying to the companies the equal protection of the
laws: St. Louis & S. . Ry. Co. v. Mathews, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep.
243.

The Supreme Court of South Dakota, in Skinner v. Holt,
69 N. W. Rep. 595, has lately held unconstitutional two
statutes of that state, which sought to render a
Exemption
life insurance policy exempt from the claims of
Laws
creditors.

The first of these was the act of I89o, c. 51,

§ 2i,'which provided that a "policy of insurance on the life
of an individual, in the absence of an agreement or assignment
to the contrary, shall inure to the separate use of the husband
or wife and children of said individual, independently of his
or her creditors; and an endowment policy, payable to the
assured on attaining a certain age, shall be exempt from
liabilities from any of his or her debts." This was held to
violate the following provision of the state constitution: "The
right of the debtor to enjoy the comforts and necessaries of
life shall be recognized by wholesome laws, exempting from
forced sales a homestead, the value of which shall be limited
and defined by law, to all heads of families, and a reasonable
amount of personal property, the kind and value of which to
be fixed by general laws," on the ground that "a law which,
without any limitation as to value, specifies a kind of property
that a debtor, solvent or insolvent, may acquire, by investing
therein or diverting thereto his entire estate, to the exclusion
of bona fide creditors, is neither ' wholesome' in character nor
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'reasonable' as to amount, and is by far too generous to be
just."
The other act was that of 1895, c. 89, which provided that
"the avails of any policy or policies of insurance heretofore or
hereafter issued upon the life of any person, and payable upon
the death of such person to the order, assigns, estate, executors, or administrators of the insured, and not assigned to any
other person, shall, if the insured in such policy at the time of
death reside or resided in this state, and leave or left surviving
a widow or husband or any minor child, to an amount not
exceeding in the aggregate the sum of five thousand dollars,
inure to the separate use of such widow or husband or minor
child or children or both, as the case may be, independently
of the creditors of such deceased, and to such amount shall
not in any action or proceeding legal or equitable be subject
to the payment of any debt of such decedent." This was held
to contravene Article i, § io, of the Constitution of the United
States, which enacts that no state shall pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts, and with Article 6, § 12, of the
constitution of South Dakota, which contains substantially the
same provision.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in a case of great local
interest, Smith v. Times Pub. Co., 36 Atl. Rep. 296, has succeeded in overturning all established precedents as
Jury Trial,
Excessive
to the functions of an appellate court in regard
Damages

to the question of damages.

In the first place,

it construes an act passed May 20, 1891, P. L. IOI,
which provided that "the Supreme Court shall have
power in all cases to affirm, reverse, amend or modify a judgment, order, or decree appealed from, and to enter such judgment as the Supreme'Court may deem proper and just, without
returning the record for amendment or modification to the
court below, and may order a verdict and judgment to be set
aside and a new trial had," as giving it the power to reverse a
verdict on the sole ground that the damages are excessive;
and then upholds the act thus construed, as not in violation
of the constitution of Pennsylvania, Art. i, § 6, declaring
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that "trial by jury shall be as heretofore." See note in
this issue.
In State v. Bockstruck, 38 S. W. Rep, 317, the Supreme
Court of Missouri, Division No. 2, held constitutional the act
of that state of April i9, 1895, which prohibits
statu
Prohibiting the manufacture or sale of any substitute for
Sale of
Imitation

Butter

buttet so colored as to resemble butter, as being
within the police power of the state; and that

the fact that portions of the statute were unconstitutional, did
not render it also unconstitutional as to the other portions.
The court fuither held that the provision of § 8 of the act, that
"whoever shall have possession or control of any imitation
butter, or any substance designed to be used as a substitute
for butter, contrary to the provisions of this act, shall be construed to have possession of property with intent to use it, as
a means of committing a public offence," did not contravene
Article 4, § 53, of the constitution of Missouri, which prohibits
the passage of any special law changing the rules of evidence.
When a majority of the voters who vote upon a constitutional amendment submitted to the people of the state at a
Amenadment general election, vote in favor of the adoption of
of consutu- the amendment, the same is ratified, though the
tion
votes cast in its favor are not a majority of the
votes cast for state officers at the general election. A majority
of those who actually vote thereon is all that is required, in the
absence of express provision: Green v. State Board of Canvassers, (Supreme Court of Idaho,) 47 Pac. Rep. 259.
Judge Stirling, of the Chancery Division of England, has
lately ruled that the principle that a publishing agreement
between an author and a publisher, or a firm of
COntract,
Assignment, publishers, is personal to the individuals entering
Author and into it, and that the benefit of such a contract is
Publisher

not assignable without the author's consent,
applies equally to the case of a similar agreement between
an author and a limited company: Griffitkt v. Tower Pub. Co.,
Ltd., [1897] i Ch. 21.
In a recent case in the Circuit Court for the Northern District
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of Illinois, N. D., it appeared that the Distilling and CattleFeeding Company, which manufactured and sold
Illegal
Considers.spirits, etc., issued to the purchasers of its goods
tion,

Rebate
Vouchers

what were called "rebate vouchers," by which,
for the purpose of securing the continuous patron-

age of the customer, it promised to pay him, in six months, a
sum equal to five cents per gallon of the goods purchased by
him. These vouchers provided that they should be valid and
payable "only on condition" that the purchaser and his successors should, during the six months specified, have bought
all his supply of such goods from the Distilling and CattleFeeding Company, or certain persons named as its distributing
agents. The company having been placed in the hands of
a receiver, certain of these vouchers were presented to him
for allowance by persons who claimed to be equitable assignees
from the persons to whom they were issued. It further
appeared that the condition as to continued purchases from
the company had not been complied with. Upon these facts,
it was held that the vouchers did not create a present obligation to pay the rebate, subject to be defeated by a breach of
the condition, but that the obligation would arise only on performance of the condition, and that, therefore, even if the condition should be held illegal, there would be no obligation
without performance; that it did not appear from the contract
that the rebate was a sum paid in excess of the price of the
goods sold, and that it could not be recovered back as money
of the customer paid on an illegal consideration, and held by
the company; that no engagement could be implied that the
company's products should be offered during the six months
at reasonable prices, or without further rebate vouchers, conditioned on still further patronage; and that the vouchers were
not illegal or against public policy: Olistead v. Distilling &
Cattle-Feeding Co., 77 Fed. Rep. 265.
A contract for the sale of the fixtures of a post office, by
which the seller, who was then postmaster, agreed to resign,
Public Policy, and to use his influence to secure the appointment
Sale of
Public Ofce

of the purchaser to the office, has been lately

declared by the Supreme Court of Arkansas to be
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void, as against public policy: Edwards v. Randle, 38 S. W.
Rep. 343The court also held that money paid under the contract
could not be recovered on the refusal of the seller to perform.
In the opinion of the Supreme Court of California, competing for premiums offered by an association on horse races
is not competing for bets and wagers, and the payWagers.
Premiums onr ment of entrance fees to the association for the
Horse Races privilege of competing in a race for which a
premium is offered does not make the transaction a wager
between the competitors; and accordingly, an agreement
between two owners of horses to pool all premiums and
stake moneys awarded on their horses, and to divide the same
equally, is valid: Hankins v. Ottinger, 47 Pac. Rep. 254.
The Court of Appeal for Ireland has recently held, affirming the judgment of the Queen's Bench Division, that, as far
Contribution, as the right of contribution between co-debtors is
Co-Sureties, concerned, the statute of limitations begins to
Limitation
run from the date at which one of them
is damnifled by being compelled to pay more than his just share of
the joint debt; and that accordingly, when one of several
co-principals to a note has made payments thereon so as to
toll the statute, and being consequently liable to pay the
whole note, does pay it, he can recover against his co-principals, though the creditor is barred by the statute from
recovering from them: Gardner v. Brooke, [1897] I I. R. 6.
. In Ernest v. Loma Gold MTines, Ltd., [1897] I Ch.
i, the
Court of Appeal of England has affirmed the decision of
corporations, Justice Chitty, [1896] 2 Ch. 572, (see 35 AM. L.
Meetings,
REG. N. S. 775,) that on a viva voce vote, at a meetVoting,
ing of a corporation, the vote of each person who
Proxies,
Viva Voce
holds a proxy must be counted as a single vote,
Vote
and not as a vote for each person for whom he
holds a proxy; and that when a notice calling a special meeting was accompanied by a circular from the secretary and
directors with a proxy attached, asking for the return of the
proxy in support of the resolution, the date of the meeting
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beihg left blank in the proxy by a printer's error, and several
of the members executed and returned their proxies duly
stamped without filling up the blanks, which were filled up
by the secretary before the proxies were lodged with the corporation, the proxies were valid.
In an action against the directors of a corporation for
paying dividends out of capital, the directors may show, in
Illegal
Dividends,
Liability of
Directors

defence, that certain notes which, if they had been

properly classed as losses, would have left the
corporation without a surplus on the day the divi-

dend was declared, were afterwards paid in full,
so that no actual loss was sustained by the payment of the
dividend: Dykman v. Keeney, (Supreme Court of New York,
Appellate Division, Second Department,) 42 N. Y. Suppl. 488.
In the same case, it appeared that, before the declaration of
the dividend, the defendants, after consulting the superintendent
of the banking department, delivered to the bank their individual notes, together with a memorandum, reciting that the
notes were given to remove a doubt as to the character of
some of the receivables of the bank, and to make the bank
unquestionably solvent. After the failure of the bank these
notes were paid to the receiver. Under these circumstances
it was held that the money so paid, in excess of the amount
necessary to make good the impairment of capital existing
when the notes were given, should be applied on the liability of
the defendants arising out of the declaration of the dividend.
When a person who has committed a criminal offense
fraudulently procures himself to be prosecuted and convicted
tribunal
criminailaw, before a justice of the peace, or other
Former
Conviction

having jurisdiction thereof, which imposes an
insignificant penalty, and the purpose of the pro-

ceedings is to avoid a real prosecution and punishment for the
offense committed by him, such conviction is not a bar to a,
prosecution brought in good faith, where the state is a party
in fact as well as in name" State v. Smith, (Supreme Court of
Kansas,) 47 Pac. Rep. 541.
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The Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia has recently
held, that in passing upon the right of nominees for public
office to appear upon election ballots, the courts
Elecons,
Party
will recognize the right of the nominating conConventions,
Admission
Delegates, of

Review

ti

vention to judge of the election, qualifications and
returns of its delegates, and will not go back of

its action to inquire into the right or title of
delegates admitted by it to act as such: Jfarcum v. Ballot
Comrs., 26 S. E. Rep. 281.
The Act of New York of 1896, c. 909, § 56, provides that
"If there be a division within a party, and two or more
by Court

Faction of

factions claim the same, or substantially the same

Party,
Rival
Conventions,
'Description on
Ballot

device or name, the officer aforesaid [the secretary
of state] shall decide between such conflicting
claims, giving preference of device and name to
the convention or primary, or committee thereof,

recognized by the regularly constituted party authorities; and
if the other faction or factions shall present no other device
or party name, the said officer shall select a different device
and party name for each such other faction, which shall be
used upon the ballots to distinguish its ticket. If two or
more conventions are called by different authorities, each
,claiming to represent the same party for that purpose, the
said officer shall select a suitable device and party name to
distinguish the candidates of one faction from those of the
other, and the ballots shall be printed accordingly." In
People v. Roosevelt, 45 N. E. Rep. 840, the Court of Appeals
of New York held, affirming 41 N. Y. Suppl. 572, that this
section applied not merely to factions within a party, but also
to a contest between two or more conventions, each claiming
to regularly represent a political party. (See 36 Am. L. REG.
N. S. 132.)
In State v. Lesueur, (Supreme Court of Missouri,) 38 S. W.
Rep. 325, a petition of nomination of "Silver party" candidates, which called for presidential electors who
Nomination
by Petition, "will
appear on the Democratic ticket," was
Signers
signed by a number of voters. Subsequently five
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of the Democratic electors resigned, and their places were
filled by nominees of the Populist party, and a new Silver
party petition was then prepared, which contained the names
of all the Democratic electors, including the fusion candidates.
To this petition was attached the signatures of the former
petition, which had been cut therefrom. It was held that the
names thus attached could not be considered in ascertaining
whether the new petition had the requisite number of signers.
When the secretary of state has transmitted to the county
officers the form of ballot to be used at an approaching elecWithdrawal tion, immediately upon the expiration of the time
of Candidate, allowed for correcting certificates of nomination,
Omission of
Name
from Ticket

he will not be compelled to instruct the county
officers to omit from the ticket the name of a can-

didate who withdrew after the form of ballot was thus transmitted, if no nomination has been made to fill the vacancy:
State v. Taylor, (Supreme Court of Ohio,) 45 N. E. Rep. 715.
Much to the surprise of any one who has followed the
decisions of that body, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
has lately decided that a policeman on duty, who,
Electric
on a rainy night, attempts to remove with his
Wires,
Contributory mace a broken wire hanging from a pole in a
Negligence

street on his beat, is not necessarily
chargeable

with contributory negligence, though he knows that the wire
is charged with electricity : Dillon v. Allegheny County Light
CO., 36 Atl. Rep. 164.

The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia following
the now well settled rule that equity has jurisdiction, by injunction, to prevent acts which will result in irreparable
Equity,
Jurisdiction, injury, has recently held that it will interfere in such
a case, even though there is a controversy as to.
Full Relief
title between the parties, and having once acquired jurisdiction on this ground, will go on to give full relief, though in
so doing it becomes necessary to decide between two adverse
titles: Bettman v. Harness, 26 S. E. Rep. 271. It also held
that the abstraction of petroleum oil or gas, they being part
of the land, is an irreparable injury, and will be enjoined.
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Under constitutional provisions, Const. Nev. § I7, that if,
during a vacancy in the officer of governor, the lieutenantGoverno,

Lieutenant-

Governor,
Vacancy

governor die or become incapable of performing
the duties of the office, the president pro tempore
of the senate shall act as governor till the vacancy
is filled, and (§ 18) that in case of a vacancy in the

office of governor, the powers and duties of that office shall
devolve on the lieutenant-governor; a vacancy in the office of
governor, creates no vacancy in the office of lieutenant-governor, and one elected to that office before expiration of the
term for which the last elected lieutenant-governor was chosen
has no claim to that office: State v. Sadler, (Supreme Court
of Nevada,) 47 Pac. Rep. 450.
The Supreme Court of New Hampshire has recently decided,
that under the married women's property acts, and the other
Husband and enabling statutes which have removed the wife's

Wife,

Domicile

disabilities, she may now, after her abandonment
by her husband, acquire a separate domicile in

another state; and on her death her estate will be administered
under the laws of the new domicile: Shute v. Sargent, 36 Ati.
Rep. 282.

In the case in hand, the husband, who was domiciled in
Massachusetts, had expressed his assent to his wife's will in
writing on the back, as required by the statutes of that state,
while they were living together as husband and wife. After
the abandonment, the wife became domiciled in New Hampshire, whose laws do not recognize the binding nature of such
an assent, and the court decided that it was inoperative, and
that the husband took his share of her estate under the distribution law of New Hampshire.
In Jack v. IKsintz, 177 Pa. 571, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that the married women's acts do not remove
the burden that rests on her of proving title to
Property
Taken in the property she claims against her husband's
Wife's Name creditors; and that when the conveyance to her
is from her parents, she must, in a contest with her husband's
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creditors, prove that she paid for it with her own money, or
that it was a gift to her.
This case has excited considerable comment; but it is
really no more than a repetition of the generally acknowledged
rule, that the married women's acts only remove the disabilities of coverture as to the possession and control of property,
and do not affect its other incidents. In this case, the bone of
contention was not the wife's possession of the property but
the manner in which she acquired it.
An association that contracts with its members, in consideration of the payment of a specified annual sum, to repair
bicycles in case of accident, and to replace those
Insurance
Whatisnotan destroyed by accident or stolen, but not to pay
Insurance
any money, is not an insurance company, which
must

be chartered under the act relating
to such

companies, but may lawfully do business under the clause of the
general corporation act, which permits incorporations for "the
maintenance of a society for .

. .

. protective purposes to its

members from funds collected therein:" Commonwealth v.
Provident Bicycle Assn., (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,) 36
Atl. Rep. 197.
The "Lloyds" insurance policies, which have had some
little vogue for years'past, and been vigorously denounced by
Lloyd.s Policy,

the regular companies, have been recently passed

Validity,
Suits Upon

upon by Judge Spring, of the Supreme Court of
New York, at Trial Term for Erie County. He

holds (I) That the stipulations in a Lloyds policy that no
action to enforce its provisions shall be brought except against
one of the underwriters, who is designated to represent all the
others, and that they will abide by the result of that action, is
valid, as its enforcement does not oust the jurisdiction of the
courts, but only prevents a multiplicity of suits, and the
action thus provided for is against one of the parties to the
contract, and not a mere agent or attorney; (2) That such a
stipulation precludes the bringing of separate actions on the
policy against the several underwriters, but does not prevent
proceeding against them to enforce a judgment obtained in the
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action prescribed; and (3) That a limitation in a Lloyds
policy that action therein must be answered within twelve
months after loss refers only to the action to establish the
claim, not to proceedings against the various underwriters to
enforce a judgment: Lawrence v. Schaefer, 42 N. Y. SuppL
992.

In Roberts v. Security Co., Ltd., [ 1897] I Q. B. 11I, a proposal for an insurance of goods against loss by burglary was
made by the plaintiff to the defendant company on
Burglary
Insurance, December 14, 1895. On December 27, 1895, at
Execution of

Policy,

waiver of

Payment of

a meeting of the directors of the company, the
seal of the company was affixed to a policy in

Premiums conformity with the proposal, and this policy was
signed by two of the directors and their secretary. It recited
that a premium had been paid for insurance against loss by
burglary from December 14, 1895, to January I, 1897, and
purported to insure the plaintiff's goods accordingly; and also
contained a provision that no insurance by way of renewal or
otherwise should be held to have been effected until the
premium due thereon should have been paid.
Upon the
night of December 26, or early in the morning of December 27, 1895, a loss of goods included in the policy
took place by burglary. The policy remained in the hands
of the company, and nothing was paid by way of premiumUnder these circumstances the Court of Appeal ruled
that the policy constituted a completed contract of insurance,
that the condition for prepayment of the premium was waived
by the defendants by the recital of its payment; and that the
policy had therefore attached.
When a judge, after the jury has retired, goes to the door
of the jury room at the request of that body, and returns and
Judge,
Misconduct

informs counsel that the jury, through its foreman,
had requested a repetition of certain instructions,

his acts constitute such misconduct as will justify a reversal of
a conviction: State v. Wroth,'(Supreme Court of Washington,)
47 Pac. Rep. io6.
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The Court of Appeals of Colorado has recently held, that
when a tenant, during the term, and at his own
Landlord and
Tenant,
Fixtures,
Removal

expense, lays a tile floor in the demised building,
he may, before the expiration of the term, remove

the tiling, and restore the building to its original
condition : Ross v. Campbell, 47 Pac. Rep. 465.
The Supreme Court of Nebraska has very wisely cut loose
from the stringent rule of Paradinev. Jane, Aleyn, 26, which
has been more or less slavishly followed up to the
Lease,
Covenant to present day by all the courts of English speaking
Repair,
Destruction of countries, and declares, in accord with Whitaker
Buildings by V. Hawley, 25 Kans. 674, I88I, that "we reach the
Fire,

Apportion- conclusion that the common law rule of construcment of Rent tion under consideration is not in force in this

state, and formulate the rule as follows: Where a substantial
portion of leased premises is destroyed without the fault of the
lessee, he is entitled to an apportionment of the rent covenanted to be paid and accruing thereafter, in the absence of
an express assumption by him of the risk of such destruction:"
Wattles v. South Omaha Ice & Coal Co., 69 N. W. Rep. 785.
Post, C. J., and Irvine and Ryan, CC., dissented.
A letter from an elector of a state to the governor, in reference to the character and qualifications of an applicant to the
governor for appointment as sheriff of the county
Libel,
Privileged
Communication,

in which the said elector resides, is not an abso-

Letter to

fiedly or conditionally privileged. The publisher
of such a letter cannot, under the guise of such a

overnor

lutely privileged publication, but is only quali-

communication, falsely and maliciously traduce and slander
the moral character of the applicant; and if he does so, he
will be liable to an action therefor. But, on the other hand,
the applicant cannot recover damages for any statements
made in such publication, unless they were -both false and
malicious; and accordingly, though the alleged libelous
matter cannot be shown by the publisher to be true, yet, if
there was reasonable ground for him to suppose that it was
true, and it was published by him in good faith, under an
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honest belief that it was true both in assertions of fact and in
comment thereon, and was published with the motive of benefitting the public welfare, without any private personal malice
towards the plaintiff, the publisher will not be liable in damages: Coogler v. Rhodes, (Supreme Court of Florida,) 21 So.

Rep. iog.
The Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division,
Third Department, held, in a recent opinion, that the discharge on habeas corps of a person committed to
Malicious
Prosecution, await the action of the grand jury is not such a
Termination termination of the criminal proceedings, as will
of Prosecution

ground an action for malicious prosecution; and
that the fact that up to the time of the trial of an action for
malicious prosecution, begun two days after the plaintiff had
been discharged on habeas corpus from a commitment to
await the action of the grand jury, no further steps were taken
in the criminal proceedings, does not show that those proceedings had been finally disposed of: Hinds v. Parker,42
N. Y. Suppl. 955.
An employe of an electric light company, who is sent to
trim lamps at a time when the wire connected with the lamps
is usually "dead," and who knows that lamps are
Master and
Servant,
never trimmed while on "live" wires, has a right
Electric
Wires,
Reliance on
Care of
Master

to. assume that the wires will not become alive
through the negligence of the company while he
is engaged in trimming them: Harroun v. Brsh

Electric Light Co., (Supreme Court of New York, Appellate
Division, Fourth Department,) 42 N. Y. Suppl. 716.
In Hitchcock v. Nixon, (Supreme Court of Washington,)
47 Pac. Rep. 412, land on which there were two mortgages
had been conveyed by the mortgagor to the first
Mortgages,
Priorities
mortgagee, who also mortgaged it. At the time
of the execution of the latter mortgage most, if not all of the
debt secured by the first mortgage was paid, and the balance
if any was paid- afterwards. Under these circumstances, it
was held that the doctrine of non-merger did not apply; and
that the lien of the second mortgage was superior to that
of the mortgage given by the grantee of the mortgagor.
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Vice-Chancellor Reed, .of the Court of Chancery of New
Jersey, has lately decided a very interesting question in
regard to the jurisdiction of equity over the acts.
Municipal
Corporation, of municipal officers.
The common council of
Injunction
Against
Act. the borough of Spring Lake, by resolution,
of Officer,

threatened to tear down a building that was being

Abatement of
Nuisance

erected on land claimed by the borough to have
been dedicated to public use. A bill was filed to restrain the
borough and its officers. The borough answered, setting up
a dedication of the building site, and further filed a cross-bill
upon the same ground, praying that the nuisance might be
abated. The Vice-Chancellor held, in a carefully considered
opinion, that though a court of equity will not, as a general
rule, correct irregularities in municipal procedure, it will
nevertheless restrain an irregular proceeding if it threatens
irreparable injury; that as the charter of the borough prescribed that it should act by ordinance, the action by resolution was irregular; that the -injury threatened was irreparable;
that the nuisance was not such as a municipal officer could
abate at common law, and that the acts threatened could
therefore be restrained. But he also held, that as a municipality, as the representative of the public, may sue to abate
or prevent a nuisance upon public property within its limits
the court would retain the cause upon the allegations of the
cross-bill, (no objection to the jurisdiction having been made
until the evidence was concluded, and the dedication of the
land appearing to be reasonably clear), and would decree an
abatement of the nuisance: Coast Co. v. Mayor, etc., of
Boroughi of Spring Lake, 36 Atl. Rep. 2 1.
The Supreme Court of Missduri has lately ruled, that the
state board of health has no authority to refuse a certificate
Physicians,
Refusal of
Board of
Health to

in
authorizing an applicant to practice medicine

the state, on the ground that the medical college
from which he had graduated had not complied

arant Certifi- with a resolution of the board requiring every
cate of A dmis-

sion to
Practice,

Mandamus

college, by a certain date, to furnish the board

with a list of its matriculates and the basis of their

matriculation, when it appears that the applicant
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was graduated before the college received notice of the resolution; and that, though mandamus will not lie to compel
the state board of health to issue a certificate to practice
medicine, when they have determined that the applicant is not
a graduate from a medical college "in good standing," the
decision of that question being within their discretion, yet
the question of good standing cannot be made to depend
merely on whether the college has complied with a resolution
of the board such as mentioned above, the statute giving
them no such power; and that a mandamus will accordingly
issue in such a case to compel the granting of the certificate:
State v. Lutz, 38 S. W. Rep. 323.
Though in general the pledgor has an adequate remedy at
law for the conversion of a pledge, yet, when the pledgee is
insolvent, and the transferee of the pledge lives in
Pledge,
another state, a bill in equity will lie at the suit
Bill to
Redeem
of the pledgor to redeem the pledge: Nelson v.
Owen, (Supreme Court of Alabama,) 21 So. Rep. 75.
The Supreme Court of the United States has recently held,
that a suit in equity against the secretary of the interior to
compel him to issue patents to certain lands abates
Public
upon his resignation from the office; that when
Officers,
Resignation,
Suit Against, such bill is filed against both the secretary and
the commissioner of the general land office, but
Abatement
so far as the latter is concerned only seeks to enjoin the execution of the orders of the secretary relative to the disposition
of certain lands, it cannot be maintained against the commissioner alone, after the suit has abated as to the secretary
by his resignation; and that in such a case the bill cannot be
.amended by making the successor of the secretary a defendant:
.Warner Valley Stock Co. v. Smith, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 225.
According to a late decision of the Supreme Court of
Washington, a city treasurer, who knowingly receives and
appropriates to his own use interest on funds of
Public
the city deposited in bank, is guilty of a violation
Officers,
Profit out of of a statute, (Penal Code Wash. § 57,) which
Public Funds makes it a felony
for a public officer to use, in
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any manner not authorized by law, money entrusted to his
safekeeping, in order to make a profit therefrom, or to use the
same for any purpose not authorized by law; the commission
of the offence denounced is proved by evidence that interest
on the city's deposits in a certain bank was credited to the
defendant's individual account, that he drew checks against
the interest so credited, which were paid, and that these checks
rapidly increased as the interest deposit grew larger; and that
the fact that the defendant does not cause the interest to be
credited to his own account, or know that it had been so
credited, is immaterial, if he afterwards appropriates the
money, knowing that it is interest on the city's funds : State v.
Boggs, 47 Pac. Rep. 417.
When an apparently helpless person is lying so near to the
outer side of a rail as to be exposed to danger from a passing
engine, and the engineer, by using ordinary care,
Railroad
Companies,
could have seen him in time to stop the train,
Negligence,
Incury to
with safety to those on board, before the engine
Person on
Track

struck him, the company is liable for the injury,

notwithstanding the man's contributory
negligence ; the duty of the engineer in such a case is the same as
if the person endangered had lain between the rails : Plarr
v. Southern Ry. Co., (Supreme Court of North Carolina,) 26
S. E. Rep. 149.

Ardemus Stewart.

